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Abstract:
Our current understanding of the Earth System has significantly 
improved in recent years. As a result, the Anthropocene is seen as a 
major planetary emergency not only for humans but for other living 
organisms too. However, Earth System science lacks a proper integration 
of the social or human side and the natural side of the Earth System into 
an organic theoretical corpus. Without such an integration a 
comprehensive understanding of the Earth System is not possible, and 
the practical actions undertaken to face the Anthropocene crisis will only 
alleviate some of its effects but the planetary emergency will keep 
deepening. The epistemological reason underlying disagreement between 
natural and social sciences is that Earth System scientists understand 
the natural side of the Earth System and the Anthropocene from a 
dialectic and materialist perspective, whereas they understand the social 
side of the studied object from a positivist and idealist perspective. Such 
a dualist approach hampers a proper understanding and the practical 
actions aimed at transcending the planetary crisis. By consciously 
adopting a dialectic and materialist epistemic paradigm under which both 
natural and social realms are studied and understood, Earth System 
scientists would be able to identify the internal contradictions of the 
studied objects and, accordingly, to address the research in the suitable 
directions. In this way, structural solutions and not merely conjunctural 
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Earth System scientists would be able to identify the internal contradictions of the studied 
objects and, accordingly, to address the research in the suitable directions. In this way, 
structural solutions and not merely conjunctural measures to face the Anthropocene crisis 
could be formulated.
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Introduction
The studies undertaken on the Anthropocene during the present century allow 
conceptualizing it as a planetary emergency affecting most of the terrestrial geospheres. 
These studies emphasize the need to deeply reconsider the current relationship between 
humans and the rest of the planet. A radical rethinking of our role on the planet has 
necessarily to involve the whole global society. Accordingly, most Anthropocene 
researchers from natural and social science disciplines claim to integrate social 
sciences/humanities and natural sciences into the Earth System science, aiming to build up 
a broader and more encompassing theoretical corpus capable of facing the Anthropocene 
crisis (Palsson et al., 2012; Mooney et al., 2013; Oldfield and Steffen, 2014, Guillaume, 
































































2014; Oldfield, 2018; Jouffray, 2020). However, many scientists from natural science 
disciplines regret the difficulties when dealing with social science theories due to the lack 
of an overall consensus on the topics studied and to the numerous and disperse approaches 
followed in social sciences, which hamper fluid communication and a proper understanding 
between natural and social science  disciplines (Mooney et al., 2013; Oldfield, 2018).
This contribution investigates the epistemological nature of the main 
misunderstandings between the social and natural sciences. For this purpose, the formal 
differences between social and natural science disciplines are distinguished from those 
differences related to the fundamentals of the natural and social sciences. A review of 
current epistemic paradigms regarding social systems in general and the capitalist 
production mode in particular is also provided. As with most natural sciences, Earth System 
science takes a dialectic and materialist epistemic view in understanding the natural side of 
the Earth System and of the Anthropocene crisis. From the social side of the problem 
however, the epistemic view adopted turns into a positivist and idealist one, which is 
dominant in mainstream social sciences—economics, politics, philosophy, etc. In this way, 
the historical and concrete character of the Anthropocene is seen under two contrasted 
epistemic views and, as a result, a comprehensive understanding of the Anthropocene 
dilemma becomes impossible in the core of Earth System sciences. An objective and 
































































concrete understanding of the Anthropocene is necessary for any practical strategy aimed to 
transcend the planetary crisis and not just to merely alleviate its effects. This can only be 
achieved from a Marxian materialist and dialectic epistemic perspective.
Science and scientific knowledge
Scientific knowledge pursues comprehension of the concrete totality studied, that is, 
comprehension of the multiple and mutually interrelated determinations whose synthesis 
shape the concrete system which is the investigated object. Scientific understanding of a 
given system requires theoretical elaboration of the observed phenomena. That is, it 
requires the transformation of the empirical phenomena given to us by practice and 
experience into concrete concepts articulated within an organic theory capable of grasping 
the movement—i.e., the history—of the object in question. Scientific understanding means 
knowing the specific role of each determination in the configuration of the investigated 
system. It means knowing the history of the system, thereby roughly predicting the 
evolution of the system. From a methodological perspective, abstraction of concrete 
concepts by theoretical thought is a remarkably different process than abstracting 
generalities from the observed phenomena. Essentially, the first is deductive while the 
second is inductive, and both are necessary and complementary moments for any 
































































understanding of the concrete reality. Empirical abstractions by induction are required in 
the process of theoretical thought and have the descriptive role upon which theoretical 
deduction can be based. They are fixed as notions in every day practice and language 
through historical and cultural processes and they are critically examined in the course of 
scientific research.
The studied object is a material reality that exists outside of the human mind and 
regardless of the sort of theoretical conceptualizations about it. Comprehension of such a 
reality is necessarily mediated first, by sensory perception of phenomena and second, by 
human thought. It is for this reason that it is subject to the mechanisms of logic. Thirdly it 
is mediated by practice as the universal criteria of truth. The ability to operate a material 
transformation of reality deciphers to what extent a scientific understanding of a particular 
system is correct or not (Ilyenkov, 1982). Practice is the ultimate aim, being an end in itself 
beyond which no other end is possible. In the process of knowledge, the human interaction 
with reality, no matter whether it is social or natural, always faces to us as objective, and 
for this reason it can be scientifically known. Abstracting generalities via induction and 
theoretical elaboration by logical deduction are a means for the dynamic interaction with 
reality—they are ‘vanishing moments’ with regard to practice. However, whatever is the 
material transformation of reality, it always appears as an objective reality independent of 
































































the way in which it is perceived and thought. In a broad sense, rational thought is 
understood “as the ideal component of the real activity of social people transforming both 
external nature and themselves by labour” (Ilyenkov, 1977: 2). Labor is here defined as the 
practical activity able to transform reality. It is the human universal par excellence, with 
immanent teleological character that implicitly requires knowing the aims and means and 
adopting ethical decisions on the particular activity undertaken, as well as on the results 
obtained (Luckács, 1980). From an anthropological perspective, labor is the specific 
activity by which humans have evolved through history into a human social being.
Scientific knowledge is here understood as a social product carried out by a 
collective social being throughout history, in which individuals participate as active 
members. They, themselves, are determined by the structures of a given historical society, 
with a given historical scientific knowledge that they submit for critical examination over 
the course of their scientific research. A collective social being means that society is not an 
aggregate of individuals that interplay among themselves following their particular 
interests, where the State, or God acts as an abstract and independent regulatory body. This 
would be a sort of Hobbesian-Hegelian conception of society, which certainly corresponds 
to some historically determined kinds of society, but is in no way a human universal. 
Rather, society is here conceived as a social being in which individuals evolve collectively, 
































































in other words, a social being that evolves with and because of the evolution of individuals 
and vice versa. In this regard, science can be conceptualized as the never-ending activity of 
the social being aimed at understanding the concrete reality and to allow a practical 
interaction and transformation. Paraphrasing Samuel Beckett’s famous quote, when 
performing scientific activity, humans “fail, fail again, fail better”. It is beyond the scope of 
this contribution to provide a detailed analysis of human understanding throughout history, 
involving religious forms, crude materialism and empiricism, ancient and Hegelian 
dialectics, positivism, postmodern relativism, and so on, which would certainly reveal a 
non-linear progress of scientific knowledge. Yet, it seems quite plausible to posit a gross 
evolution of human knowledge from an abstract and idealist understanding based on myths 
and Gods to a more concrete and materialist-based understanding of reality that allows a 
more practical and particular interaction with it.
Natural and social science disciplines
Splitting scientific knowledge into natural and social science disciplines was a formal 
division promoted by neo-Kantian philosophers in the XIXth century (Ilyenkov, 1982), 
partly in response to Hegelian philosophy. Before such rupture most philosophers and 
thinkers, including those in earlier modernity (Steno, Leibniz, Petty, Descartes, etc.), had a 
































































broader and all-encompassing approach that did not make such a sharp distinction between 
the social and natural sciences. The most relevant formal difference between the fields of 
social and natural sciences is related to the time-scales over which the respective studied 
objects evolve compared to how the time-scales at which the theories on those objects do.
The object studied by natural sciences does not usually change in the course of the 
historical development of its theoretical understanding. In other words, the time-scale of the 
evolution of the studied object occurs over such orders of magnitude that it can be 
neglected with respect to the time-scale at which the different theories on the object evolve. 
This is the case for physics, biology, geology, and most of the natural science disciplines. 
The theoretical understanding of the cosmos has significantly evolved from geocentrism, 
heliocentrism, gravitational physics and relativity, but the object studied has remained the 
same in the course of this evolution. Similarly, a theoretical understanding of the origin of 
life and the evolution of species has changed since Lamarck, Darwin, Oparin, and to 
present genetic theory, but the object studied is the same for all of them. In these cases, old 
theories are generally seen as simple and abstract expressions of the theoretical 
understanding of the object, while recent theories are seen as more complete and concrete,  
the whole theoretical development corresponding to the “failing, failing again, failing 
better” process mentioned above. For example, Alfred Wegener’s continental drift is a 
































































simple and abstract theory with respect to the more complete and concrete plate tectonics.
Things are different for social science disciplines. Here, the evolution of the studied 
system occurs on about the same time-scale as the evolution of the theories on it. In these 
cases, the historical unfolding of the theories roughly reflects the historical development of 
the studied object (Ilyenkov, 1982). Moreover, the different theories throughout history 
provide different forms of dynamic interaction with the system that may interfere with its 
development. This may modify the phenomenal forms in which the studied object is shown 
and, accordingly, may modify the inductive abstraction of generalities inferred from 
empirical and sensory perception. To illustrate the mutual interaction between the 
development of the studied system and the development of the theoretical understanding in 
social science disciplines, a crude analogy with Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle could be 
made which, colloquially affirms that the empirical determination of two variables 
interferes with the state of these variables. For example, a theoretical understanding of 
social production modes have grossly evolved contemporaneously alongside the practical 
interaction with Nature, leading to its material transformation and to the different 
production modes observed over human history. Hence, Aristotle could not have a concrete 
concept of abstract labor because at his time abstract labor as a social average did not exist. 
In contrast, David Ricardo was able to understand abstract labor as the substance of value 
































































because abstract labor as a social average constitutes the social reality of capitalist 
production (Ilyenkov, 1982).
The formal differences between the natural and social sciences explain why 
naturalists can see themselves as external observers to the studied system, whereas social 
scientists cannot. Although a deeper understanding of the reality of natural systems usually 
reveals that the activity of scientific research does interfere with the studied system, in most 
cases and for practical purposes, such activity can be neglected. Hence, Heisenberg’s 
principle is not restricted to particle physics, but it applies to Newtonian physics too, or if 
we consider measuring the temperature of the ocean, it implies a mutual interaction, a 
change of both water temperature and thermometer temperature (Piedra Arencibia, 2016). 
In these cases, as in the scientific research of the history of the Earth, the history of life and 
the history of the cosmos, humans can neglect the interference of their activity on the 
objects they study, although such interference does, obviously, exist. However, when 
dealing with social systems, an approach that places us as external observers to the system 
is no longer possible because the practical interaction with the system strongly modifies the 
studied object and its scientific understanding. For example, humans can change and have 
changed their modes of social organization throughout history, hence, understanding social 
production modes and the practical transformation of production modes are mutually 

































































Natural laws and social production laws
There is a deeper—not just formal—difference between the natural and social sciences.
Natural systems do not develop under any teleological design that determines the goals to 
be achieved and the means needed to achieve them. Rather, the evolution or history of 
natural systems is shaped by the interaction of multiple determinations that are mutually 
concatenated in a concrete way and, for this reason, they can be objectively known. 
Understanding the system means knowing the specific interplay of each determination with 
regard to the network of determinations that shape the  object being studied. That is, it 
means understanding why and how a determination has a concrete role and not any other in 
a particular system. For example, in the atomic system each particle is in a particular 
relation with other particles and only this relation is possible within the limits of the 
system. Similarly, in the cellular system, in the plate tectonics system, each element is in a 
concrete relation with other elements of the system too. That is why deterministic laws 
describing the interactions of the elements forming the object—the history of the system—
can be formulated. Therefore, the theoretical understanding of Nature based on deductive 
logic, if correct, reveals a number of deterministic laws and principles that are compulsory 
































































within the limits of the studied system. For example, Newton’s law of gravitation for 
macroscopic bodies, Heisenberg principle for atomic particles, genetic laws for living 
beings, Steno’s law of superposition for sedimentary strata, etc. Humans are always subject 
to these laws regardless of the kind of practical interaction with the system and regardless 
of the way in which the system is thought to be. Again, practice is always the criteria that 
validates whether a theory is correct or not. For example, nuclear energy and nuclear 
weapons validate particle physics as a correct theory and genetically modified organisms 
validate modern genetics as roughly correct too. Note that such practical validation of 
theories does not imply any ethical position on the topics involved, nor does it have any 
immanent mandatory requirement. That is, the scientific understanding of particle physics 
does not mean, necessarily, that the atomic bomb has to be made, nor does the scientific 
knowledge of genetic laws mean that living organisms must be genetically modified. Here, 
concrete ethical decisions are possible precisely because the scientific theories are roughly 
correct. Actually, ethical decisions permeate the whole scientific research process, mainly 
in the form of the ethics and morals currently considered to be standards for a given 
society. For this reason, scientific and technical knowledge is not neutral (Piedra Arencibia, 
2018). In any case, natural laws are always mandatory and, say, if humans want to fly with 
airplanes they have to strictly consider the law of gravitation.
































































Social systems are subjected to the laws and principles of Nature too, since humans 
have to necessarily operate within the natural limits and they “can work only as Nature 
does, that is by changing the form of matter” (Marx, 2015: 31). Hence, humans have to 
follow natural laws in their practical interaction with Nature. However, social systems can 
be changed by conscious and unconscious human action and, therefore the specific rules 
and principles of a given type of society can be substituted by others. This usually implies 
the profound transformation of a society into a new one, affecting the form in which social 
systems produce and reproduce themselves according to their particular features and the 
form in which the social reality is perceived and understood. For example, the form in 
which hunter-gatherer societies reproduced themselves—including both the material and 
the ideal forms of social reproduction—is compl tely different from the form in which 
slave societies did it, which in turn is completely different from the particular form of 
feudal societies, and different again from that of the capitalist society. All of them, 
however, share labor as a universal concrete concept that mediates between Nature and 
humans and without which no kind of social system is possible. Presently, humans produce 
themselves as a historically complex social being based on their practical interaction with 
Nature through labor. Therefore, the key difference between natural and social systems, 
involving practical activity, epistemology and ethics, is that social systems and their 
































































corresponding laws can be transcended whereas natural systems and natural laws cannot.
Because the capitalist society is the typical case of an autonomous social system 
spontaneously developed on the basis of commodified interpersonal relationships that are 
not subjected to a previous subjective design, deterministic laws similar to those of natural 
systems can be discovered and describe the dynamics of the system. To this end, however, 
a proper epistemic paradigm is necessary, otherwise the laws of capitalist production will 
not be revealed.
Epistemic paradigms of capitalist society
Capitalism is the first global society in human history, and it involves not just the material 
production of goods and services but the ideal production of notions, concepts and theories 
too. Material production and the production of ideas are necessary and inseparable 
moments for any social organization to reproduce itself according to its own foundations. 
Traditionally, there have been two contrasted epistemological approaches to understanding 
capitalism in particular and social production modes in general.
Positivism and idealism
From a positivist perspective, knowledge is understood as performed by individuals 
































































isolated from social reality with regard to the process of knowledge. It is an atomist view 
by which social knowledge is seen as an aggregation of individual contributions. 
Individuals conduct inductive abstractions of generalities from their empirical and sensory 
perceptions, and concepts are the verbal forms (the terms) describing the common features 
perceived in the studied object. Hence, positivism does not distinguish notions—the forms 
of knowledge obtained by abstracting generalities from the empirical and sensory 
perceptions—from concepts—the forms of knowledge implying theoretical elaborations 
and abstractions by deduction—or, if so the distinction has only a formal character. 
Moreover, from a positivist perspective, there is no difference between thought and 
language, between the logic forms and the laws of thought and their symbolic expression in 
languages. For example, the neopositivist verification principle states that a scientific 
theory is correct if it is in formal agreement with the empirical data observed. The main 
logic principle underlying positivism is that of non-contradiction, which prescribes that 
although reality appears as contradictory, scientific theories can not have internal 
contradictions.
Mainstream social theories are based on formal or positivist logic. This means that 
the object studied—in our case, the capitalist mode, but in general, any social production 
mode—is not seen as a concrete totality shaped by the interaction of multiple 
































































determinations nor is it considered to be a dynamic object that results from evolution 
through an historical process. Rather, it is considered as a puzzled object composed of 
separated departments, which can be approached independently and whose aggregation 
encompasses the studied system. Eventually, the interactions among those departments—
for example, education, economics, law, among others—will be highlighted, but the 
capitalist society is not seen as a concrete totality that can be understood based on 
elementary concepts abstracted from reality whose internal unfolding arises in the different 
phenomenal forms shown by empirical perception. Note that an historiographical 
exposition of events, that is, of the phenomenal expressions of the social system, cannot 
reveal their internal connections. Only the unfolding of the fundamental principles 
immanent to the system may provide a true history—the course of the development—of the 
system. Typically, a positivist approach proceeds by inductive abstraction of generalities 
from the observed phenomena and from the interconnections between already established 
notions and analytical categories. From there, one develops a formal deduction leading to 
formally consistent theories. The best case of a social scientific discipline driven by a 
positivist understanding of the studied reality is that of economics, but others are 
Malthusian and Neomalthusian demographic studies and Scientometrics.
The object studied by economics is the material production of the goods and 
































































services that all societies need to produce in order to reproduce themselves based on their 
particular characteristics. In the capitalist mode, production is not designed according to a 
previously conceived plan aimed to evaluate the needs of the society and the means and 
processes that are necessary to satisfy these needs. Rather, production is, above all else, 
commodity production, and it is driven by the profit inherently contained in any 
commodity. Based on this, producers—capitalists—find their position in the productive 
process of society and obtain a portion of the total profit produced. The spontaneous and 
non-planned interaction of individuals in the capitalist mode has been explicitly 
acknowledged by classical political economists such as Adam Smith with his well known 
‘invisible hand market’, by the Austrian school’s economists (von Misses, Hayek, etc.) who 
acknowledge the system of prices as a spontaneous mechanism that provides information to 
individual capitalists for their investment strategies and the formation of prices as an 
aleatory process, and, actually, it is recognized by all economists regardless of the school to 
which they ascribe. Time series of stock market values have been mathematically modeled 
by polynomial fit and other statistic techniques to provide investment tools for financial 
capitalists (Hendry, 2004). This is a clear example of the spontaneous and uncontrolled 
character of market prices, which are formed as a result of aggregated individual actions 
unconsciously exerted with regard to a comprehensive understanding of the economic 
































































system. For this reason, not only a system of market prices is needed, but mathematical 
tools aimed to navigate within this system as well. The example illustrates the positivist 
approach that underleies mainstream economics and, accordingly, the misunderstanding of 
capitalist fundamentals.
From a positivist perspective, the capitalist mode is conceived ahistorically as an 
absolute production mode, and not as an organic system that resulted from the internal 
development of fundamental elements, which constitute the essentials of the system and 
whose unfolding reveals the empirical phenomena observed and the history of the system. 
Here, the connections between the phenomenal forms (prices, profit, rent) and the essential 
concepts underlying such forms (commodity, labor, value) are not investigated. As a result, 
the system is not studied as an organic whole, but only the phenomena obtained by sensory 
perception are considered in order to articulate a formally consistent theory that ends up 
becoming a tautology, usually based on argumentative fallacies. In this way the system 
studied is not subjected to critical research but, on the contrary, it is formally legitimized. 
For example, the Austrian school endorses the need for a ‘free’ market and the formation of 
aleatory prices by assuming that production can only be organized based on aggregated 
individual actions driven by profit. That is, an historical form of social production and its 
corresponding social being is taken as absolute and, according to this premise, the 
































































characteristic interaction of individuals in terms of economy under such an historical form 
is given as an argument for the institutional expression of this interaction, namely, market 
prices (Cockshott and Nieto, 2017).
The approach of mainstream economics has a straightforward corollary: the  
materialism underlying the scientific knowledge of the capitalist mode of production is a 
positivist-based materialism and, therefore, it results in an idealist-based understanding of 
this particular production mode. Accordingly, the scientific understanding of this social 
system is reduced to a formal explanation that absolutizes the capitalist social being and the 
phenomenal forms of the capitalist production mode. In practice, this means that objective 
knowledge of the studied system becomes impossible and the only option is to navigate 
within the system with the help of spontaneous and uncontrolled social mechanisms. In this 
way, the fundamental contradictions of this particular social system—recurrent economic 
crises, unequal wealth distribution, and the Anthropocene crisis, among many others—
remain unexplained and unsolved. All mainstream economic schools—marginalist, 
Neoclassical, Keynesian and Neokeynesian, Ricardian and Neoricardian, etc.—share a 
common background of a subjective theory of value,  implying that value is an individual 
sensory perception that cannot be objectively known, and only a formal, mathematical 
understanding of value forms(rent, profit, capital) is possible. The differences between 
































































mainstream economic schools are therefore just formal differences with regard to the 
subjective perception of value. As a result, an empirical phenomena of capitalist production 
such as the periodic economic crises is invariably attributed to the aggregation of bad 
individual decisions, but the immanent relationship of such crisis to the essentials of the 
production mode is never investigated. In summary, the positivist materialism of 
mainstream economics reveals the true idealist character underlying its epistemic approach.
Dialectics and materialism
An opposed epistemic view to positivism is dialectical materialism. Here, notions are seen 
as social rather than individual. Notions are fixed and expressed in language through 
historical and social processes and not as a result of perceptions and abstractions of 
individuals isolated from society, with regard to the process of knowledge. Rather, 
individuals come to historical social systems with already fixed notions and face them as an 
objective reality, which has to be individually apprehended and appropriated. In this view, 
thought is seen as the particular mode of the ideal activity of the social being as reflected in 
individuals. From a dialectic and materialist perspective, notions are fixed in culture and 
they are distinct from concepts; that is to say, the necessary theoretical elaboration of 
notions by logical deduction in thought, which have a symbolic expression in verbal 
































































language, mathematics, music, etc. Both notions and concepts must be critically reviewed 
in rigorous scientific research based on dialectics and materialism.
Marx’s Capital constitutes the best example of a materialist and dialectic approach 
consciously and systematically applied to the understanding of a social system: the 
capitalist mode of production. In other words, Marx’s Capital is a practical exercise of a 
dialectic and materialist epistemic view aimed at understanding a concrete mode of social 
production (Ilyenkov, 1982). However, most of the so called Western Marxism has not 
properly understood the materialist dialectics of Marx’s Capital because a positivist and 
idealist epistemic conception is dominant in western countries. The ‘official’ philosophy 
during Stalinism and later on, was also driven by a positivist and idealist approach, which 
deformed the Marxian dialectical materialism into the so called DIAMAT (DIAlectical 
MATerialism). For these reasons, and after the collapse of Soviet-style economies, Marxian 
dialectical materialism has not been well received in western culture. Nevertheless, 
Marxian materialist dialectics attained the highest development in the Soviet Union during 
the 60s and 70s of the last century, with philosophers such as Evald Vasilievich Ilyenkov 
and many others who still remain poorly known. As pointed out by Chukhrov (2013), there 
is a remarkable epistemological gap between western culture and ‘unofficial’ Post-
Stalinism Soviet culture that hinders a fluid dialogue. Such an epistemological gap is 
































































ultimately based on two contrasted epistemic views, a positivist and idealist understanding 
of social systems in the west, and a materialist dialectics one in the former Soviet east.
In Marx’s Capital, the capitalist society is investigated as an organic historical 
system by unfolding the internal contradiction of the system’s fundamental element: the 
commodity. By developing the internal contradiction of commodities, Marx is able to 
deduce value as the historical form of labor under the capitalist mode, money as a 
phenomenal form of value, capital as value that valorizes with the appropriation of the 
surplus value exerted by the labor force and, for this reason, capital as the fundamental 
social relationship of capitalist society. The phenomenal forms of value (salary, rent, profit, 
interest) are logically deduced in Marx’s Capital by sequentially unfolding the 
contradictions of analytical categories derived from the practice of capitalist production, 
starting with commodity as the primary element. Here, every abstracted concrete concept 
accounts for the necessary conditions of existence of any particular phenomenal form that 
is empirically perceived in relation to the rest of the phenomena being studied. In turn, 
every abstracted concrete concept is the necessary consequence of the existence of the rest 
of phenomena. In Marx’s dialectic and materialist understanding of the capitalist mode, 
profit is a value form, it is both a consequence of value and a prerequisite of value. The 
result of Marx’s research is a theoretical corpus in which abstract and simple categories are 
































































dialectically connected to complex and concrete categories, allowing to understand not only 
the material production but also the ideal production, that is, how the ideal forms are settled 
in the culture and language of bourgeois society. Such a concrete interrelation of the 
multiple determinations shaping the particular studied object cannot be obtained by 
inductive abstraction of generalities of phenomena. It can only be accomplished by a 
deductive-logic process in which inductive abstraction is a necessary vanishing moment. 
This means that the concept of value cannot be obtained by abstracting generalities of the 
value forms, but rather, by unfolding contradictions by logical deduction, starting with the 
fundamental element of the system, the commodity. Only this method can provide the 
concept of value and its concrete relations with the value forms. The epistemological 
method followed by Marx in Capital is known as the ascent from the abstract to the 
concrete and it allows a scientific understanding of the capitalist concrete totality and its 
multiple determinations (Ilyenkov, 1982).
From an historiographical perspective, Marx benefited from the modern materialist 
tradition (Locke, Descartes, Berkeley, etc.), which he reviewed critically by examining 
Feuerbach’s materialism. Marx benefited from the modern dialectic tradition that started 
with Spinoza and culminated with Hegel, which he also critically reviewed . In this way, he 
was able to go beyond the classic political economists (Petty, Smith, Ricardo) in the 
































































scientific understanding of the capitalist mode. Classic political economy attained its 
highest development with Ricardo. However, he failed (for a number of reasons) in trying 
to build up a theoretical corpus that was aimed to organically understand the fundamentals 
of capitalist production. First, he conceived of the capitalist production as absolute and not 
as an historically determined production mode. Second, he was not able to identify the 
primary element—namely, the commodity—from which unfold all the phenomenal forms 
of the production mode. Although Ricardo correctly distinguished concepts as concrete 
theoretical abstractions from notions fixed in language, he imagined an immediate 
correspondence between value and value forms, that is, a non-contradictory correspondence 
between  value and profit, for example. As a result, he pretended to find value by 
abstracting it from the generalities of the value forms (profit, salary, rent) and, as long as it 
is not possible, he concluded that the unfolding of value into value forms occurs only in 
thought and not in reality. In summary, Ricardo’s efforts to deduce value from value forms 
were based on formal deduction, revealing the positivist and idealist nature of his approach 
(Ilyenkov, 1982).
Nevertheless, Ricardo’s efforts to understand the relations between the universal 
concrete concept of value and its phenomenal expressions were much more scientific than 
most of the mainstream economists that followed him. At least, he correctly identified 
































































abstract labor as the substance of value, and production as the key moment of capital 
valorization, whereas most mainstream economists undertake a scholastic legitimization of 
the capitalist mode usually based on vulgar empiricism. For example, Piketty’s bestseller 
shows impressive data on the uneven wealth distribution in capitalism but it is not able to 
connect it to the structural foundations of capitalist production (Piketty, 2017). As a result, 
his proposal is merely reduced to taxing the profits capital such as to redistribute wealth. 
However, this leaves untouched the capital reproduction status quo, which includes the 
Anthropocene crisis. Such a simple proposal does not obviously need a scientific 
understanding of the production mode and does not solve the structural problem of 
capitalist production. Besides, the math developed by Piketty relies on Neoclassical 
argumentative fallacies aimed to show that the profit rate of capital does not descend during 
capitalist production and, therefore, that the reproduction of capital is able to provide an 
‘infinite’ wealth, which, ‘unfortunately’, is wrongly distributed. Maito (2014) uses the same 
database as Piketty to show that the rate of profit descends when it is properly estimated. 
Based on an opposed epistemic paradigm to Piketty, Marx was able to show that uneven 
wealth distribution is a must of capitalist production. Marx was not describing empirical 
data like Piketty, but he was based on logical deduction following the law of capitalist 
accumulation, which was formulated by himself and has this concise expression: 
































































“Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time accumulation of misery, 
agony of toil slavery, ignorance, brutality, mental degradation, at the opposite pole, i.e., on 
the side of the class that produces its own product in the form of capital” (Marx, 2015: 
345). According to Marx’s dialectics, uneven wealth distribution is a necessity of capital 
accumulation that any tax can cancel.
The concept of the Anthropocene
From an epistemological perspective, the Anthropocene is a concrete concept, or concrete 
abstraction, shaped by the synthesis of multiple determinations interacting from both the 
natural and social realms. The concept of the Anthropocene as a planetary crisis is obtained 
by theoretical abstraction and logical deduction of observed phenomena obtained by 
sensory perception and empirical experience. The empirical data collected on the 
Anthropocene crisis by Earth System scientists is extremely clear: the current planetary 
crisis is human-induced, it is historically restricted to, at most, the last 200–300 years and 
the crisis itself as shown by the ensemble of empirical indicators that have deepened during 
this historical period, regardless of if a particular indicator shows a partial recovery. Hence, 
the Anthropocene reveals that human action exerted through a particular and historically 
determined social system, that is, the capitalist mode of social production, is the main 
































































determinant in the concrete concept of this planetary crisis (Chen, 2017; Foster, 2017; 
Soriano, 2018).
The crisis of the Anthropocene has dramatically changed the Neokantian traditional 
break between the natural and social sciences. The Anthropocene, as a concept that results 
from the human interaction with the planet under an historical mode of social organization, 
above all reveals the inadequacy of the traditional dualist approach based on the separation 
of natural and social sciences. Here, everything is so closely interrelated that such a dualist 
approach is methodologically incorrect and, besides, the close interaction between natural 
and social processes cannot be fully untangled if natural and social realms are treated 
separately. Second, the Anthropocene reveals that scientists can no longer approach the 
Earth System as external observers, as has been usually done in the natural sciences. 
Finally, it reveals that the practical activity aimed at transcending the planetary crisis 
depends on a correct understanding of the social and natural determinations of the crisis. 
That is, if the interrelations between natural and social determinations are not properly 
conceptualized under a suitable epistemic paradigm, the crisis will deepen and humans will 
not be able to transcend it.
The Earth System science approach to the Anthropocene
































































Natural and social science disciplines are formally different regarding the time-scales over 
which the studied objects and the theories about them evolve. In addition, natural systems 
and natural laws cannot be substituted, while social systems and their laws can be changed 
by others provided a suitable human action is followed. For these reasons, and in particular 
after the Neokantian break-up between the natural and social sciences, philosophers and 
thinkers have questioned whether it is possible to undertake a theoretical and objective 
understanding of social systems based on logical deduction, as is usually undertaken for 
natural systems. When Earth System scientists from natural disciplines approach social 
science theories in the context of the Anthropocene crisis they have to deal, perhaps 
inadvertently, with this epistemological question. The epistemological perspective adopted 
by Earth System scientists when dealing with this question is crucial to a successful 
understanding of the Anthropocene dilemma. 
Due to the immanent relation of the Anthropocene crisis with capitalism, a scientific 
understanding of the capitalist mode of production is unavoidable in order to properly face 
the planetary crisis underlying the concept of the Anthropocene. Otherwise, the practical 
actions undertaken will regrettably only alleviate some of the effects of the planetary 
emergency, but they will not be able to transcend it. When naturalists incorporate social 
science theories into the corpus of Earth System science they do not critically reexamine 
































































these theories, including those of the capitalist mode of production. Rather, they form their 
ideal conceptions on the social issues following the current and dominant epistemic 
paradigms. This is quite understandable since “Not every artist has a well-developed 
concept of art, by any means, although he may create magnificent works of art. The present 
author is not ashamed to admit that he has a rather vague notion of the atom, as compared 
to a physicist. But it is not every physicist that has a concept of the concept” (Ilyenkov, 
1982: Concrete Unity as Unity of Opposites). Regarding the social component that needs to 
be considered together with the natural component in order to have a comprehensive 
understanding of the Anthropocene crisis, the epistemological view adopted in Earth 
System science is that of mainstream economics, philosophy, politics, and so on. However, 
a positive solution to the crisis demands a critical reexamination of theories in most social 
science disciplines, and in particular of theories regarding the capitalist mode of production 
because the ultimate cause of the crisis is the concrete relation of humans with Nature 
under this production mode. Neither scientists from natural disciplines nor scientists from 
mainstream social disciplines involved in Earth System science have undertaken such a 
critical review and, therefore, they are not equipped with the suitable epistemological 
background demanded by the Anthropocene crisis.
Understanding Nature implicitly acknowledges that Nature is an objective material 
































































reality outside of the human mind and independent of the way in which it is thought and 
known. Earth System science is not an exception. Understanding the Earth as a concrete 
entity in which the particular interaction of multiple determinations are characterized, is 
always an unfinished process that allows knowing the history and the dynamics of the Earth 
System. Such a view would have been impossible from an idealist-based perspective, where 
it lacks any concrete internal articulation, and only individuals are able to confer a structure 
upon Nature by means of thought and language. In other words, from an idealist 
perspective, Nature is deprived of any causal concatenation or history, which is only an 
attribute of human thought and language (Piedra Arencibia, 2017). On the contrary, from a 
materialist perspective, a materialist-based approach to Nature is a demand of the object 
studied. It is an epistemological requirement based on the fact that Nature is an objective 
and material reality. Earth System scientists proceed, whether they are aware or not, 
according to a materialist-based epistemic view when dealing with the natural component 
of the Anthropocene crisis.
Nature is dialectical too, and the dialectics of Nature is not merely a theoretical 
construct but a construct that is only possible because Nature is inherently so. Otherwise, 
how is it possible to ‘construct’ dialectics if it is not yet in the studied object, which is the 
ultimate source of any empirical perception? The origin of life and the evolution of species 
































































are examples of dialectics in Nature. Organic molecules, which are the basis for the origin 
of life on Earth, evolve as a ‘negation of’ or ‘in contradiction to’ inorganic molecules and 
constitute a new structure of matter with new and particular laws than the laws of the 
inorganic realm. Contradiction is the driving mechanism of the evolution of species too, in 
which differences among individuals within a species evolve into differences among 
species, that is, contradiction of individuals with respect to an average becomes the 
differentiation of a new average (Levins and Lewontin, 2009). The internal constitution of 
matter from the Higgs boson to the classic atomic particles and to molecules is the result of 
an evolution based on contradictions of the constitutive elements, usually expressed as 
opposed electric charges, but not only. Actually, particle physics is based on the 
contradiction principle as the driving mechanism by which matter is constituted and 
differentiated. The well known wave-corpuscle duality is the example of a contradiction 
defining both the identity and the difference of matter. Practical application of the wave-
corpuscle duality in electron microscopes shows that the contradiction is real, and for this 
reason it is seen as a logic contradiction in thought— it is expressed in language too. The 
elliptical orbit of planets and satellites is defined as the unit of two opposite movements, by 
which planets get closer to and move away from a larger planet or star. Natural systems are 
historical. They evolve autonomously by overcoming successive contradictions, and at any 
































































step of the evolution the newly established conditions  assume in their core the structural 
laws and the evolution of previous stages. To borrow a term from evolutionary biology, the 
evolution of natural systems occurs in homeostasis and, hence, inorganic matter evolves 
within the structure of organic matter, cellular elements evolve within the structure of more 
complex living organisms, and so on. As shown by the Anthropocene crisis, the whole 
Earth System is now evolving within the structure and laws of the capitalist production 
mode.
Contradictions are not merely logic constructs of thought due to failures in the 
subjective perception of reality or due to failures in the subjective theoretical elaboration of 
the empirical perception, and they can not be solved by formally refining theories as 
claimed  by formal logic. Rather, they reflect the real contradictions of the object, and both 
the real contradictions and the logic contradictions are necessarily and formally expressed 
in language. For this reason it is not possible to make an a priori distinction—based on 
verbal expression—between a real contradiction and speculative contradictions that are not 
related to reality or are useless in terms of the practical activity (Iliénkov, 1999). Only an 
analysis of the content of the verbally expressed language as related to the practical 
interaction with the material reality allows a discrimination between real and speculative 
contradictions. Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle may help to illustrate the real nature of 
































































contradictions. Essentially, it states that the empirical perception of an object based on its 
perturbation turns out to be the very impossibility of its perception. Newtonian mechanics 
had inadvertently overcome this paradox by neglecting the effect of the perturbation in the 
object and particle physics has pragmatically overcome it by probabilistic means, which is a 
formal solution. In any case, the contradiction stated by the Heisenberg principle is not 
canceled because it is a real contradiction.
However, most naturalists are unaware of the dialectic constitution of Nature and 
they are also unaware of the dialectic and materialist epistemic view they are following in 
the scientific understanding of Nature. Naturalists are forced to spontaneously undertake 
this epistemic view because the studied object is a material and dialectical reality. The 
epistemic approach to Nature has to be consistent with the structure of Nature, otherwise 
knowledge is incomplete. In other words, the dialectics of Nature reflects in human thought 
as dialectical logic and as a dialectic and materialist understanding. Yet, as pointed out by 
Piedra Arencibia (2017) paraphrasing Marx, naturalists ‘do not know what they do but they 
do it’. This is the key difference between Marx’s approach to the study of social production 
modes and naturalists’ approach to the study of Nature. Marx consciously adopted a 
materialist and dialectic view to understand capitalism, whereas naturalists have 
unconsciously adopted this epistemic view to understand Nature. Nevertheless, conscious 
































































Marxian dialectics and unconscious naturalists’ dialectics are the correct approaches to 
understand the studied objects, as shown by the predictive character achieved by their 
corresponding scientific corpus. For example, astronomical tuning of deep sea sediments 
allows not only to calibrate the time scale of chronostratigraphic successions of the 
geological record but also to predict the cyclic stratigraphy of future successions as long as 
similar boundary conditions prevail. Similarly, the law of the tendency of the rate of profit 
to fall predicts the long term evolution of capitalist production and has been empirically 
confirmed more than a century after Marx’s logical deduction.
Although it may sound paradoxical, the Anthropocene crisis is the empirical 
evidence that humans are following the correct path with regard to understanding the 
concrete functioning of Nature. The Anthropocene shows that the materialist and dialectic 
view of Nature is roughly correct because it reveals the true internal articulation and history 
of Nature. In other words, the inner structure of Nature is dialectic and material and for this 
reason only a materialist and dialectic approach is able to reveal such an internal 
configuration, which includes the present planetary crisis. In a nutshell, humans are nothing 
else than an evolution of matter; they are the thinking body of Nature and thought is an 
attribute of matter (Iliénkov and Naúmienko, 2016). That is why humans in the capitalist 
production mode have been able to subsume natural laws under capital reproduction laws. 
































































The concept of the Anthropocene reveals the ultimate contradiction of the capitalist 
production mode: the contradiction of capital reproduction with Nature and with humans as 
the thinking body of Nature.
Earth System science inadvertently proceeds according to a materialist and dialectic 
view with regard to understanding not only the present day configuration of Earth but also 
the history of the Earth. That is why a more concrete and complete knowledge of the 
multiple determinations and their mutual relations that shape the Earth System is possible. 
Consider the evolution of the Bretherton diagram or the Geologic Time Scale from their 
initial configurations in the last century up to the present day. Overall, they show the 
ongoing process of a more complete and concrete understanding of Earth. Unfortunately, 
this is only true for the ‘natural side’ of the studi d object but not for the ‘social or human 
side’. With regard to the social aspect of the Earth System and of the ongoing 
Anthropocene crisis, Earth System scientists conduct themselves under a positivist and 
idealist view, and as a result, a scientific integration of humans and their social production 
modes into the Earth System science becomes impossible. According to this dichotomic 
epistemic approach, Earth System science promotes a sort of planet stewardship to manage 
the planetary crisis that is based on a misunderstanding of the fundamentals of capitalist 
production, namely, a stewardship that is based on a positivist and idealist view of the 
































































relation between humans and Nature under this production mode. Ignorance of the 
socioeconomic laws of capital reproduction—the law of value, the law of capitalist 
accumulation, the law of the of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, and so on—results 
in an idealistic conception, which imagines that humans control the production mode when 
it is in fact just the opposite; they are controlled by a production mode in which capital is 
the subject that dominates social reproduction (Soriano, 2018). Hence, imagined human 
agency to face the Anthropocene crisis is a fallacy within the limits of capital reproduction. 
The only possibility for an harmonious relation of humans and Nature is to get out of this 
production mode. Sustainability, corporate social responsibility, circular economy, 
ecological economics, degrowth, and, in general, all versions of green or human capitalism 
rely on several fallacious arguments. First, that the capitalist production mode is absolute 
and not historic. Second, that the reproduction of capital can be managed by a number of 
technical procedures usually based on crude positivism, implying the vulgar 
mathematization of society, which may deprive individuals of their human-social character. 
Third, that the social system can be properly managed as long as appropriate individuals 
awarded with some idealized humanism and skills are in charge. However, no matter 
whether he or she is in charge, the laws of capital reproduction will have to be followed and 
the differences in management will be only formalities. Although management may 
































































certainly alleviate some of the effects of the Anthropocene crisis it cannot change the 
course of the crisis. The different research projects and publications of the Future Earth 
network are examples of positivism and idealism regarding the social aspect of 
Anthropocene crisis. Some of the technical proposals therein may help to alleviate the crisis 
but the crisis itself will keep deepening. This has not been acknowledged within this 
network because a dialectic and materialist approach is lacking (see 
https://futureearth.org/). In summary, Earth System scientists’ proposals to face the 
Anthropocene crisis are not based on a comprehensive and scientific approach to the Earth 
System encompassing humans and human societies. Such an approach has to necessarily 
rely on a dialectic and materialist epistemic view that is consciously adopted. 
Unfortunately, this is not the epistemic perspective of Earth System science. 
Conclusions
Earth System scientists have unquestionably performed an invaluable contribution to our 
understanding of the Earth dynamics and of the ongoing planetary crisis. However, Earth 
System science has not been able to properly integrate the ‘social side’ and the ‘natural 
side’ of the Anthropocene crisis within a theoretical corpus based on a consistent epistemic 
view. Therefore, a comprehensive understanding of the Earth that includes humans and 
































































human societies and their role in the Anthropocene crisis is still lacking. The incomplete 
understanding of the Earth harms the proposals launched by Earth System scientists in 
order to face this planetary emergency. The main reason is epistemological in nature. While 
the Earth System is understood based on a materialist and dialectic epistemic view, which 
is correct, humans and human societies (the social being) are understood according to a 
positivist and idealist epistemic paradigm, which is incorrect. By consciously adopting a 
dialectic and materialist paradigm, Earth System scientists will be able to highlight the 
main contradictions in our current understanding of Nature, including both social and 
natural systems. In this way, scientific research can be addressed to solve contradictions 
and to build up a more complete and concrete understanding of the Earth System and the 
Anthropocene. Accordingly, practical actions aimed to transcend the planetary crisis and 
not merely to alleviate it, could be undertaken.
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